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What’s Next for Iranian Regime Leadership After Khamenei’s Death
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This combo of file photos show Iran's key political and religious figures (Top L–R) Iranian Leader Ali Khamenei (now deceased), President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran Ali Larijani, Chief Justice Gholam Hossein Mohseni Eje'i, Head of Assembly of Experts Mohammad-Ali Movahedi Kermani, and Secretary of the Guardian Council Ahmad Jannati. (Bottom L–R) Khamenei's chief of staff, Mohammad Golpayegani; Khamenei's adviser on international affairs, Ali Akbar Velayati; Khamenei's adviser on foreign policy, Kamal Kharazi; First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref; Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf; Tehran Friday Prayer Imam Ahmad Khatami; and Khamenei's son Mojtaba Khamenei. (AP Photo/File)
By Omid Ghoreishi
3/2/2026Updated: 3/8/2026

News Analysis

Speculation about who could replace Ali Khamenei—who was in power for 37 years—as head of the Iranian regime had over the years developed a narrative of its own, with names ranging from his cleric son to former presidents and even a leadership council.

But with a U.S.–Israel strike incapacitating the regime by taking out key sites and figures, starting with Khamenei himself on day one, the situation is too fluid to say with any level of certainty who could assume the leadership and who the real power brokers now are, analysts told The Epoch Times. Any candidates could be eliminated in the barrage of strikes, or the regime itself may fall, they said.

Although the situation is evolving rapidly, some probable scenarios are emerging regarding whom the regime may rely on in the interim and how the leadership role may be structured.

Officially, the leadership role for now is held by the three-person Interim Leadership Council, composed of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, and Guardian Council member Alireza Arafi, as required by the Islamic Republic’s constitution.

But there is speculation that other behind-the-scenes figures and organizations could be making the key decisions, especially when it comes to U.S. negotiations to ensure the regime’s survival. The joint U.S.–Israel strike on Iran was launched on Feb. 28 after multiple rounds of talks on Iran’s nuclear program failed.

As per the constitution, a permanent leader needs to be selected by the 88-member clerical body Assembly of Experts. Its building in Qom, Iran, was hit in the strikes, Israeli officials said on March 3.

Iranian regime leader Ali Khamenei delivers the weekly Friday prayer sermon at Tehran University in Tehran, Iran, on June 19, 2009. (Behrouz Mehri/AFP via Getty Images)

Iranian regime leader Ali Khamenei delivers the weekly Friday prayer sermon at Tehran University in Tehran, Iran, on June 19, 2009. (Behrouz Mehri/AFP via Getty Images)


Khamenei’s Decades in Power


The multiple assemblies and councils within the power structure of the Islamic Republic, along with a network of powerful organizations—led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which extends its reach into all aspects of society, from business to politics—mean that there is no shortage of regime insiders who could fill key roles.

But Khamenei had firmly established his grip on the regime during his decades in power, and his death leaves a significant vacuum.

“This is certainly an unrecoverable blow to the Islamic Republic,” Babak Shekarabi, an Iran affairs analyst based in Canada, told the Persian edition of The Epoch Times. “In a system such as the Islamic Republic’s, they don’t allow power to be transferred in an effective way. More specifically, Khamenei never allowed it to happen.”

Belgium‑based political analyst Saeed Bashirtash said that both the ongoing strikes and the Islamic Republic’s structure mean that no one can effectively replace Khamenei.

“It took Khamenei himself many years to solidify his power after becoming leader,” Bashirtash told the Persian edition of The Epoch Times.

Khamenei became the guardian of the Islamic jurist—the official title of Iran’s supreme leader—in 1989 after the death of the regime’s founding leader, Ruhollah Khomeini. The doctrine of the guardianship of the Islamic jurist holds that a qualified Shiite cleric should wield ultimate authority over state affairs, giving the leader supreme power over the nation.

Before becoming leader, Khamenei had been the third post-1979 Islamic revolution president of Iran under Khomeini. Shortly after assuming leadership, his religious rank was swiftly elevated, a move contested by some established clerics.

Like his predecessor, he imprisoned and executed opponents of the regime. And like him, he sidelined regime insiders who might have threatened his hold on power. Some of these moves were overt, such as the house arrest of former Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi, who contested the 2009 presidential election results.

However, speculation about purges behind the scenes is nearly limitless, given the opaque nature of authoritarian regimes. Rumors have circulated over whether founding leader Khomeini’s son Ahmad Khomeini died of natural causes at age 49 or was targeted as a potential leadership rival, with similar speculation surrounding the death of figures such as long-time regime power broker and former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani who died in 2017.

Women walk past electoral posters of Alireza Arafi, a candidate for the upcoming Assembly of Experts state-vetted elections, in Tehran, Iran, on Feb. 21, 2024. (AP Photo/Vahid Salemi)

Women walk past electoral posters of Alireza Arafi, a candidate for the upcoming Assembly of Experts state-vetted elections, in Tehran, Iran, on Feb. 21, 2024. (AP Photo/Vahid Salemi)


Power Wielders


Alireza Kiani, a U.S.-based Iran analyst and editor-in-chief of the Fereydoun publication, said that within the three-person Interim Leadership Council now formally leading Iran, the president and the head of the judiciary are not seen as the main players. Greater importance is given to the third member, Guardian Council member Arafi, a well-established cleric.

Arafi, the former Friday prayer imam of the religiously important city of Qom—home to Iran’s main Shiite seminary—has held senior roles in a number of influential bodies within the regime, including the Guardian Council, Assembly of Experts, and the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution.

“The diversity of posts that Arafi has held doesn’t necessarily mean he has occupied highly important roles, but it does indicate that he enjoys a wide and deep network of institutional loyalty,” Kiani told the Persian edition of The Epoch Times.

He said that commentary on the leadership capacities of Arafi and others should be tempered by the fluid nature of the situation. In his view, rapid change is likely before figures such as Arafi have an opportunity to solidify their leadership prospects.

Bashirtash said he shares the same view, adding that the regime is in freefall, with the leader and key IRGC and other military heads eliminated, and the rest in hiding to avoid targeted attacks.

Still, he said, the IRGC remains a major political power in the background, noting that Arafi’s influence will also depend on the support of the IRGC.

He cautioned to not lose sight of other key power brokers behind the scenes. These include Ali Larijani, currently secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, speaker of the Parliament of Iran, he said.

Beyond their current titles, the two have long been key figures in the IRGC and other key organs of the Islamic Republic. Larijani and his brothers have held important positions in the regime, but he is the most influential among the five brothers, having been appointed to key posts by Khamenei. Ghalibaf, a former mayor of Tehran and chief of police in the country, was also a trusted figure of Khamenei.

Bashirtash said it is possible that they all may use someone like Arafi as a front for now, with those behind the scenes calling the shots.

Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council (L), and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, speaker of the Parliament of Iran, in Parliament in Tehran, Iran, on May 27, 2024. (-/AFP via Getty Images)

Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council (L), and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, speaker of the Parliament of Iran, in Parliament in Tehran, Iran, on May 27, 2024. (-/AFP via Getty Images)

Ardeshir Zarezadeh, a former political prisoner in Iran and president of the Canada-based International Center for Human Rights, also emphasized that the IRGC is a key player in the background.

“You need to look at it from this perspective: Why are the [U.S.–Israeli] striking forces removing Khamenei and other high-profile security, military, IRGC figures, but not the others?” he said in an interview, pointing to the real power-holders within the regime.

Bijan Kian, a California-based analyst who has held senior positions under multiple U.S. presidents, said another factor dogging the regime that points to shifts in power dynamics is the fact that some members of its senior ranks may be working with the United States and Israel—in some cases to help bring about changes in the regime’s leadership to advance their own goals, in other cases simply to act as spies.

“Can you imagine the head of a state being eliminated with such ease on the very first day, in the opening hours of a military operation?” he told the Persian edition of The Epoch Times. “It’s impossible. There must have been help from the inside.

“Those who helped from inside may not have full power at the moment, but they acted hoping to gain power. Also, some may have helped considering that for years foreign powers have infiltrated Iran. Without [these insiders] such an operation wouldn’t have been possible.”

This view is also shared by Shekarabi and Kiani, who said it is unlikely that Khamenei could have been targeted by the United States and Israel with such precision without insider knowledge.

Leadership Contenders


Assuming that the regime gets a chance to select a permanent leader, a few other names have been widely cited as possible contenders, should they survive the strikes.

One long‑time contender has been Khamenei’s son Mojtaba Khamenei, a cleric, although there have been no confirmed public statements about his status. Whether that is a tactic to keep him safe or whether he has also been struck remains unclear.

Another possibility is founding leader Khomeini’s grandson Hassan Khomeini, although he has been kept out of the main circles of power in the Khamenei regime.

There is also the cleric brother of the powerful Larijani family, Sadeq Larijani, who is currently chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council. As a cleric, he is the only one of the brothers eligible to serve as leader. However, allegations of a major corruption scandal that resulted in the arrest of his deputy in 2019 may weigh against him, along with public criticism of him by powerful clerics.

Former Iranian regime leader Ruhollah Khomeini's grandson Hassan Khomeini stands next to Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during the 36th anniversary of the death of Khomeini, the founding leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, at Khomeini's shrine in southern Tehran, Iran, on June 4, 2025. (Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA/Handout via Reuters)

Former Iranian regime leader Ruhollah Khomeini's grandson Hassan Khomeini stands next to Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during the 36th anniversary of the death of Khomeini, the founding leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, at Khomeini's shrine in southern Tehran, Iran, on June 4, 2025. (Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA/Handout via Reuters)

Another contender was former President Ebrahim Raisi, who died in a helicopter crash in 2024. Some have also speculated that his predecessor, former President Hassan Rouhani, may have a chance.

Other contenders include members of the Assembly of Experts, such as Mohammad Mahdi Mirbagheri.

Even with the risk of elimination by strikes, some contenders may still be willing to assume the leadership role, Bashirtash said, driven by opportunism and the awareness that, either way, they are unlikely to meet a favorable end as key figures of the regime.

“They have no way back and know that in the end, no good outcome awaits them,“ he said. ”But perhaps they believe that by accepting the leadership role, they can at least satisfy their ambitions.”

The Regime’s Catch-22


Shekarabi said the regime faces a tough choice on the leadership question. If the more hardline faction chooses someone unwilling to make concessions to the United States, he could suffer the same fate as Khamenei. But if the more pragmatic faction succeeds in installing a leader who is conciliatory toward Washington, the regime’s internal crisis would intensify, as hardliners would be unlikely to accept such a shift.

He said this external crisis is compounded by a popular uprising that will not be satisfied with mere reforms and that seeks to topple the regime. This time, the uprising is being organized by the Washington-based Crown Prince of Iran Reza Pahlavi, he said.

“Either way, they face major challenges that could very well bring an end to the regime,” Shekarabi said.

Shahrzad Ghanei contributed to this report. 

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