Young Chinese nationals living overseas are targeted by the CCP to work as spies via methods like financial incentives, career opportunities, online grooming, or outright coercion, says a former Australian Federal Police (AFP) agent.

Paul Johnstone’s comments come in response to the arrest of three Chinese nationals have been charged with reckless foreign interference for allegedly spying on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on a Canberra-based Buddhist group called the Guan Yin Citta.

The accused individuals are 31-year-old Suri Zheng and 25-year-old Joseph Vance (a pseudonym), who were both charged in Canberra on Feb. 11, as well as 37-year-old woman who’s pseudonym is Thomas Tyler, was charged last year.

All three remain on bail, with Tyler pleading not guilty.

Career, Ideology, Romance, or Blackmail

Johnstone, a security expert who has worked with the CCP’s police apparatus in China before, said the young age of the perpetrators “suggests possible grooming, ideological shaping, or coercion.”

“Youth can make individuals more susceptible to manipulation, but it also underscores the long-term strategic nature of alleged foreign interference efforts,” he told The Epoch Times.

“At the same time, Beijing’s use of young foreign influencers to promote China in a positive light highlights the potential financial rewards and career incentives available to those aligned with messaging linked to the CCP.”

Johnstone, who made his first trip to China in 1987 and has trained police across the continent, said some methods include “financial incentives, career opportunities, ideological persuasion, flattery, romantic relationships, or online grooming through social media and gaming platforms.”

“Youths can be targeted via scholarships, business links, or influencer roles,” he said.

“They may also exploit family ties overseas, coercion, blackmail, data harvesting, or internships that provide access to sensitive environments. Long-term cultivation is common, gradually normalising requests.”

CCP Official Tells Spies to ‘Climb as High as You Can’

Based on police documents submitted to the ACT Magistrates Court, Tyler and the two co-accused maintained contact with a foreign official from China’s Public Security Bureau from 2022 to 2025.

The official told Tyler, who husband is alleged to be a Public Security Bureau employee, to infiltrate the Guan Yin Citta’s inner circle to gather intelligence.

The CCP has designated the group an “evil cult” (xie jiao) in mainland China and subjected it to persecution on the grounds that it poses a threat to the regime.

“You can slip in, climb as high as you can,” the foreign official told Tyler, to which the 37-year-old replied, “Are you serious?” She then later said, “I’ll give it a proper go and see if I can sneak in.”

The foreign official replied to Tyler, “Doesn’t this have a bit of a spy thriller feel to it? First, maintain confidentiality. Second, inform me immediately if anything arises.”

“If you climb high enough, you’ll be commended directly by the leaders in Beijing.”

According to the documents, Tyler tasked Vance with investigating the Guan Yin Citta and collecting data from its website, local news sites, and social media posts, including information about its organisational structure and activities.

The foreign official also tasked Tyler with inquiring about the group’s activities in Sydney and Melbourne, which she later assigned to Zheng.

Johnstone said that infiltrating the sect was in the interests of Beijing because of the “strategic value if it connects to diaspora networks, fundraising channels, or online influence ecosystems.”

“Beijing’s United Front strategy has historically prioritised influence at community level, not just national leadership,” he said.

“Smaller religious or cultural groups can shape narratives, mobilise opinion, host visiting speakers, or provide access to political, business, or academic circles.

“Monitoring—or in some cases pressuring—such groups may also serve a deterrent purpose, signalling to other diaspora organisations that dissent, alignment with Taiwan, Tibet, or Falun Gong, or criticism of Beijing will not go unnoticed.”

Situation Moved ‘Beyond Speculation’

According to Johnstone, Australian authorities could counter such foreign interference through legislation and community awareness programs.

“Prevention includes university briefings, corporate security training, stronger cyber protections, transparency laws, use of human informants within the Chinese diaspora and encouraging early reporting of suspicious approaches to police and the National Security Hotline,” he said.

At the same time, Johnstone believed that the AFP’s actions against the three alleged spies suggested more serious outcomes.

“When the Australian Federal Police acts in a suspected espionage matter, it usually signals that concerns have moved beyond speculation and into evidence-based thresholds,” he said.

“If action occurred, it suggests authorities believed activities may have crossed into foreign interference, coercion, surveillance, or undeclared intelligence collection.”