News Analysis

Amidst policy dilemmas, communist leader Xi Jinping may have joined China’s “lying flat” trend, according to experts who cite signs in Chinese economic policies, propaganda coverage, and military personnel changes after a major party conference in mid-July.

“Lying flat,” or “tang ping” in Chinese slang, is an online buzzword that emerged in China in 2021. It refers to a passive attitude toward addressing life and work challenges.

The mid-July conference, also known as the “third plenum,” is the main event at which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sets its economic policies every five years. Aside from reiterations of the success of a “socialist market economy” and emphasis on national security, analysts saw no coherent plan for economic recovery.

China’s economy did not rebound as expected after Xi lifted his zero-COVID policy in December 2022. In the following years, he resisted calls for drastic measures to rescue China’s debt-laden property market and local governments, sectors whose problems were exacerbated by the pandemic. Instead, the CCP rolled out a series of smaller stimulus packages, such as moderate cuts to lending rates and support packages to homebuyers.

Yet China’s economic prospects have not improved. During the first half, national tax revenue declined more than 5 percent year-on-year, and local government debts have also accumulated faster than the country’s GDP. The country’s second-quarter gross domestic product (GDP) grew 4.7 percent, missing the 5.1 percent analyst consensus forecast. Investments in real estate development and housing during the first seven months both dropped by over 10 percent year-on-year.

Shi Shan, a China expert and an Epoch Times contributor, said the opacity of Chinese politics makes watching signs in power dynamics important indicators of China’s future direction.

“We have observed that the authoritarian regime functions on a different track than in the past five years,” he told The Epoch Times. “Changes may be happening in the CCP’s political structure.”

At a forum a week after the third plenum, Xi made a rare public admission that China’s economy faces difficulties and challenges. He emphasized the importance of having faith in China’s economic development and following the CCP’s leadership.

Meanwhile, China’s State Council stepped up to lead the Party’s economic agenda.

Misalignment Between State Council and Xi’s Economic Policies

The State Council is the executive body of administrative powers headed by the Chinese Premier. Under the CCP, the Party always trumps relevant government bodies, which are supposed to follow the Party’s directive.

However, the State Council moved contrary to the Chinese leader’s previous policies.

On Aug. 3, the CCP’s State Council announced 20 specific measures to boost private consumption in China’s service sectors. These measures are similar to those released a year ago. However, the previous version didn’t mention sectors such as education and gaming, two sectors Xi previously made a priority.

In 2021, China banned private tutoring companies from running for-profit on school curriculum subjects and going public to raise funds. The police even arrested private tutors during class to enforce the new regulations.

In a recent episode of NTD’s Chinese-language program Pinnacle View, independent Chinese TV producer Li Jun said the policy change was “quite unusual” and indicated potential power dynamic changes at the top levels of the CCP.

Shi said that the policy change came across as a “correction” of Xi’s policies and, therefore, “definitely undermines Xi’s authority within the CCP.”

“Xi cannot tell everyone that his economic policies have failed. He has to hide behind others and let them make the adjustments,” Shi said. “That means that Xi is lying flat.”

Less Propaganda Coverage for Xi

Xi taking a back seat is also shown in CCP’s propaganda, where he has had less exposure.

On July 15, the first day of the third plenum, the special feature “Xi Jinping, the Reformer” was removed from CCP-controlled media platforms in China.

The CCP’s main mouthpiece, People’s Daily, has only featured the Chinese leader once in a few days since the conclusion of the third plenary session. Before that, the newspaper featured Xi daily on its front page.

Major Military Personnel Reshuffle

The CCP uses economic growth and regime propaganda to create a mandate and false widespread consensus for its ruling. To stay in power, the party leader also controls China’s People’s Liberation Army. Yet, Xi also seems to be struggling on this front.

In June, the CCP formally expelled former defense ministers Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe. Li Shangfu was absent from the public eye for two months last year before the CCP announced his removal, ending his seven-month ministerial career.

In the past 10 months, Xi has reshuffled three commanders out of the five theater commands, an unusual sign of the party chief’s concern about authority and loyalty in China’s armed forces. “Disloyalty” was one of the charges against the two former defense ministers.

Tang Jingyuan, a China affairs commentator, told The Epoch Times, “These signs suggest that the failure of Xi’s rule has led others within the Party to question and even challenge his authority to some extent.”

Such high-level personnel change mirrored what former Chinese dictator Mao Zedong did in his final years. Fearing that military commanders of various regions would form local power bases and potentially stage coups, Mao started periodically rotating military commanders to prevent any single individual or group from gaining too much power.

“To stabilize his power and prevent a coup, Xi has had to change his commanders in key military regions, just as Mao Zedong did,” said Tang.

Local CCP Officials ‘Lying Flat’

Within the CCP’s hierarchy, Xi may not be the only person “lying flat.” The trend started from the regime’s local government officials.

After “lying flat” went viral in China as a meme, a county in southeastern China issued “Lying Flat” awards to three local government agencies in 2022 to criticize their inaction in governing.

In the past three months, some local governmental officials have taken action differently. Many took to social media to openly report abuse and unfair treatment by their superiors.

For example, a former local judge in northeastern China accused his court’s enforcement officer of corruption and harboring criminals. A local prosecutor in southwestern China reported a Party secretary for using torture to coerce confessions and create false cases.

In China’s police system, police officers in northwestern China and a province near Beijing reported local Party secretaries for corruption and severe violations of Party discipline.

Li Jun said the open criticism and reporting reflected local officials’ loss of faith in the CCP’s governance.

Shi sees a bigger problem.

“Politically, when senior leaders are ‘lying flat,’ the ramifications are severe,” he said. “Historically, at the end of Chinese dynasties, when senior ministers and the Emperor decided to abstain from their powers and duties and to ‘lie flat,’ the collapse of their rule accelerated significantly.”

The last two emperors in China’s late Qing Dynasty were dominated by other Imperial family members and played a passive role in the power struggles in the Forbidden City.

The “lying flat” trend has trickled down to local government agencies to the point that state employees time spent playing poker games has drawn scrutiny from the regime’s media.

Beijing Youth Daily, the official newspaper of Beijing’s communist youth league, criticized the popularity of a new poker game as a manifestation of the deepening “lying flat” trend among China’s public servants.

Shi said that this was partly driven by local officials seeing that Xi has “lain flat.” However, according to Shi, they are also cautiously watching because they don’t know when Xi will stand up again, just like Mao, who launched the Cultural Revolution to regain power after “lying flat” in a similar style for a few years.

Lynn Xu and Olivia Li contributed to this article.