News Analysis

A few weeks before China’s key annual meetings, known as the “Two Sessions,” analysts saw signs of another wave of anti-corruption campaigns led by the Chinese leader Xi Jinping, potentially targeting top communist officials previously spared.

This campaign is widely seen as part of Xi’s broader strategy of power consolidation under the guise of fighting corruption within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The Two Sessions is scheduled to begin on March 4.

On Feb. 16, Beijing’s official magazine republished a speech by Xi from last year, emphasizing that the anti-corruption initiative remains “severe and complex” and that Politburo members “must play an exemplary role.”

No one would have a get-out-of-jail-free card for corruption, Xi had previously told top disciplinary officials. “There will be no iron-cap princes,” he said, referring to a special nobility title during China’s last dynasty. In exchange for their services to the founding emperor of the Qing Dynasty, these grand dukes could pass down their titles and privileges to future generations without downgrades.

The equivalents to the grand dukes would be current and former members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), a seven-member exclusive club of the highest ruling organ of the CCP.

The first time “iron-cap princes” appeared in the official propaganda was in January 2015, the third year since Xi took over the Party. One grand duke he spared was Zeng Qinghong, a former PSC member who controlled China’s petroleum industry. In return, Zeng supported Xi’s rule within the CCP.

Experts say that a high-profile target in Xi’s anti-corruption campaign could be Zhang Youxia, the second-in-command in the Central Military Commission. Xi may aim to reclaim an absolute grip on the military ahead of the Two Sessions, the regime’s annual plenary sessions, where the rubber-stamp National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference meet simultaneously in Beijing.

Signs that Xi’s military power had been weakened began to reveal themselves last July.

PLA Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese military, also called the People’s Liberation Army, started promoting a group decision-making mechanism opposite to the “centralized, unified leadership”—the one-man rule Xi had been championing.

The tone of personal worship toward Xi in state-run media also noticeably cooled.

Xi’s Political Mentor Under Potential Investigation

In early February, Cai Shenkun, a veteran Chinese journalist now living in the United States, wrote on social media platform X that Xi’s political mentor and his family were under investigation.

Cai has earned a reputation as a credible newsbreaker, with a track record of flagging the ousting of high-ranking CCP officials, most of which were later confirmed.

Jia Qinglin, a former PSC member, played a significant role in Xi’s rise to power, from the city to the provincial and communist central committee levels. After taking over the Party, Xi publicly thanked Jia for his “trust and support” in shaping his career.

According to Cai, Jia was also known as the “King of Fujian” because of his family’s wealth. Fujian is a coastal province close to Taiwan and Xi’s power base, where he worked for nearly two decades.

“For these reasons, Xi would not easily take action against Jia,“ Cai said in his X post in Chinese. ”If Xi initiated an investigation into Jia and his family, it could only be due to pressure from other Party elders and factions within the CCP.”

Military Infighting

Xi’s comment about “iron-cap princes” triggered speculations about his new targets.

Chen Pokong, a U.S.-based political analyst, told The Epoch Times that Xi’s reference to “iron-cap princes” was likely a warning to Zhang Youxia. Chen suggests that the rumored investigation of Jia could well be Zhang’s pushback against Xi.

A veteran of the 1979 Sino–Vietnamese War, 74-year-old Zhang is one of the few princelings with real combat experience, which has earned him exceptional respect within the Chinese military and the senior ranks of the CCP.

“Princelings” refer to the offspring and subsequent generations of the CCP’s top officials. These families enjoy greater privileges and hold influential positions within state agencies and state-owned entities across various sectors, including military, technology, and finance.

“When Xi hinted at targeting Zhang as an ‘iron-cap prince,' Zhang’s faction responded by pushing Jia forward as one who fits the bill,” Chen said. “In doing so, they show their capabilities to challenge Xi.”

Crucial Political Meeting Delayed

A major Party conference, known as the Fourth Plenary Session of a CCP Central Committee, has yet to be finalized. This planning session is convened at least once during a Central Committee’s five-year term and focuses on key Party issues such as leadership succession arrangements. It didn’t occur last fall as initially scheduled.

The issues to be discussed are very sensitive, given Xi’s explicit goal of securing a lifetime term.

Amid a deep power struggle between Xi and his rivals, his failure on the economic front placed him in an even more precarious position.

China’s economy is experiencing a significant downturn, marked by a struggling real estate sector, weakened consumer confidence, and a sharp decline in exports. Many attribute the current economic recession to Xi, who has wielded absolute power in policy-making, including managing the economy.

Xi’s perceived economic failures have allowed his rivals to respond when he targets them for a purge. However, according to commentator Chen, they cannot afford to remain passive.

When Xi’s anti-corruption campaign reaches the highest levels of power, it often becomes a fight to the death, Chen noted. For example, Fu Zhenghua, the former minister of justice, was convicted of bribery and abuse of power for personal gain in September 2022 and sentenced to life in prison.

Thus, Chen expects Xi’s recent anti-corruption remarks to provoke a strong backlash from rival factions.

“For the anti-Xi forces, being passive now would mean accepting inevitable defeat,” he said. “In other words, they’ve been pushed to the brink, and only by fighting to the end can they hope to break this vicious cycle.

“Both sides seem to be on the verge of confrontation, ready to face each other, making the political atmosphere increasingly tense.”